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• 1.0- .i-.)iguous and then considered 
extriosic evij^rjce to clarir; the parties* intent. These findings 
were affirmed by the Utah Supreme court whicii, st-at-pdi 
"If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of 
law, we accord its construction no particular weight, 
reviewing its action under a correctness standard." 
699 P.2d at 716. 
Thus, the threshold question of whether a contract is 
ambiguous is itself a question of law which must be reviewed by 
this Court before a determination can be made whether the lower 
court properly considered extrinsic evidence and the quality of 
that extrinsic evidence. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 
(Utah, 1983). 
In this case Judge Uno found that the contract was 
unambiguous which Plaintiff asserts is error. This Court must 
review that error, in the first instance, without resort to any 
evidence which may be of record. 
Indeed, the lease contract at issue in this case is 
similar to that construed by the Court in the case of Seashores, 
Inc. v. Hancey, supra. In that case the contract was held to be 
ambiguous when it referred to information on "other sheets" and 
"other contract documents". The court reasoned that without 
resort to the other documents referenced in the contract it was 
impossible to determine whether the main contract contained all 
material terms and was thus ambiguous. Similarly, in the case at 
bar, reviewing the renewal termination language in paragraph 4 is 
so unclear that it raises many questions about what the parties1 
intended and is therefore ambiguous. If the Lessor intends to 
terminate, as that paragraph provides, the question arises of 
when can this termination be exercised - is it after one ten year 
term, after a "like successive period" (twenty years) or after 
"like successive period or periods." (thirty, forty, or 
infinity)? This ambiguity arises by failure to define the length 
of time meant by "period" as used in that paragraph or to provide 
a reference and definition for the phrase "said term" which can 
literally mean from ten years through perpetuity. As found by the 
court in the Seashores case a lack of clarity in such a situation 
requires a finding that the contract is ambiguous. 
Lastly, once an ambiguity is found in a contract and 
extrinsic evidence is considered to resolve the ambiguity, if the 
contract is still unclear a court must apply the rule of 
construction to interpret the ambiguity against the drafter of 
the contract. This approach was recently clarified in the Court 
of Appeals case of Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, (Utah App. 
1988) 748 P.2d 582, 583, and footnotes 1 and 2, and cases cited 
therein. It is for this purpose that the affidavits of the 
Plaintiffs should have been considered by Judge Uno to explicate 
for the court the expectations of the previous lessors on the 
lease term issue. After an appraisal of Plaintiff and Defendants 
evidence on this point, Plaintiff submits the intent of the ori-
ginal contracting parties is still in conflict and cannot be 
determined with the result that the lease should be construed 
against the drafter, Reagan Outdoor Advertising. 
II. DOES APPLICATION OF "ENGLISH RULES OF CONSTRUCTION" 
REQUIRE A FINDING FOR DEFENDANTS 
The Respondent argues that there is no ambiguity in 
paragraph 4 of the lease because of the presence of a semi-colon 
which in effect links two independent clauses. In this way 
Respondent asserts that the lease provides for an automatic 
renewal and then contains subsequent language providing for 
possible termination at the end of this renewal. 
This complicated approach does not clarify the intent of 
the parties or eliminate ambiguity in this lease. Rather, it in 
fact adds additional ambiguity. Indeed, the need to discuss gram-
matical technicalities to interpret the lease is evidence of its 
misleading, ambiguous nature. The language in question at 
paragraph 4 is as follows: 
"This lease shall continue on the same terms and con-
ditions for a like successive period; thereafter, this 
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and 
conditions for a like successive period or periods, 
unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination 
within ninety days of the end of said term". 
Lease Agreement, para. 4. 
If the semi-colon in the third line is indeed replaced 
by a period as Respondent asserts, the following sentence still 
contains an ambiguity. For example, if the lease term of ten 
years was extended automatically for a "successive period" then a 
total of twenty years will have elapsed. Looking at the language 
following the work "thereafter" there is again language calling 
for a continuation of the lease for "a like successive period or 
periods" unless a termination notice is delivered. A question 
thus arises whether termination is permissible after twenty 
years, thirty years, forty years, or in effect, never as the 
interpretation of "successive period or periods" is entirely 
undefined in this contract. Thus, there is indeed no resolution 
to the patent ambiguity of this paragraph under Respondent's ana-
lysis. 
It is well settled that any document must be construed 
from its four corners and all provisions construed together and 
not in isolation. Barnhart v. McKinney, 682 P.2d 112 (1982, KS.). 
Since there are still critical questions as to when the lessor 
can terminate this lease, which a court cannot answer within the 
four corners of this document, the lease must be held to be ambi-
guous. Fundamentally, the goal of contract interpretation is to 
give it the meaning intended by the parties and rules of grammar 
should not be permitted to control the construction of a contract 
when to do so would render language meaningless. Rubenstein v. 
Weil 408 P.2d 140, (New Mexico, 1965). Certainly, a reasonable 
interpretation of the term and termination provisions of this 
lease contract should begin with a reference to the explicit 
language stated in paragraph 2 which states that the contract is 
one for a "term of ten years" and referring then to paragraph 4 
where the lessor may terminate "within ninety days at the end of 
said term". There is no other reference to the word "term" other 
than this ten year reference and a logical construction is that a 
lessor may thus terminate within "ninety days of the end of said 
term". That is, at the end of ten years as Plaintiff attempted. 
Such a construction does not resort to grammatical revision 
or technicalities of punctuation but is a direct and reaso-
nable interpretation of the contract language itself. This is 
supported by the well settled view that specific provisions where 
they exist in a contract, will supercede and qualify more general 
ones. Norman v. Recreation Centers of Sun City, Inc., 752 P.2d 
514 (Ariz. App., 1988). 
Respondent's brief cites Hampton v. Lum, 544 SW.2d 
(Civ. Ct. App.TX. 1976), and Faulkner v. Farnsworth, supra, to 
support its argument that the lease is not ambiguous. Both these 
cases are distinguishable as presenting fact situations very dif-
ferent than the one at issue. In Lum the lease had a renewal term 
that clearly contained the word "renewal" and the lease at issue 
here does not. Faulkner was held to be an ambiguous lease because 
too many questions were raised by written changes to a standard 
agreement. In the present lease the language is purporting to 
create a right of "renewal" is amenable to numerous interpreta-
tions, is hidden, and is phrased in a misleading manner. This 
lack of clarity makes the term ambiguous, and this Court should 
find so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons this Court should find that 
the lease contract is ambiguous and should be construed against 
the drafter defendant Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Alternatively, 
"I hi J "i1 ni i "l ill I ,i ] ! mi 11 nil i lie L e a s e L a c k i n g in m u t u a l i t y , t h a t it is 
illusory, or unconscionable .tnd therefore void, ?nr *->^ce 
reasons, the Court, snou , . . .*n 
ten years and thus no longer binding * -i\*i:*. 
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